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IPOs and the Slow Death of Section 5
Donald C. Langevoort' and Robert B. Thompson'
S ECTION 5 of the Securities Act of 19331 is slowly dying. We have to be carefulabout making such a bold-sounding claim because Section 5 performs two
distinct legal functions. First, it creates a presumption that offerings of securities
using the facilities. of interstate commerce have to be registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). Elsewhere, we and others have
described the momentous shifts in the pattern of exemptions that allow issuers
to avoid registration, especially after the JOBS Act of 2012.4 This function is
very much alive, albeit in ways that to us seem to push in the direction of more
unregistered capital raising transactions rather than more public offerings.
That is not the aspect of Section 5 that concerns us here, however. A
second and very different function takes up almost all of Section 5's statutory
text: restraining the marketing of registered public offerings so that
salesmanship does not run ahead of the mandatory disclosure that is supposed
to inform investor decisions of whether to buy or not, something often referred
to as "gun-jumping."' This is a devolution we find interesting and insufficiently
examined in legal scholarship. Our focus will be entirely on the initial public
offering ("IPO"), the paradigmatic form of issuer capital-raising, and not
offerings by seasoned issuers.'
1 Thomas Aquinas Reynolds Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
2 Peter P. Weidenbruch Jr. Professor of Business Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
3 15 U.S.C. § 77e (2012).
4 See Robert B.'Thompson & Donald C. Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries
in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1573 (203) (discussing the effects of the
JOBS Act on general solicitations); see also Michael Guttentag, Protection from What? Investor
Protection and the JOBS Act, 13 U.C. DAVIS Bus. L.J. 207, 243-44 (2013) (analyzing provisions of
the JOBS Act that allow firms to easily avoid disclosure obligations); William K. Sjostrom, Jr.,
Rebalancing Private Placement Regulation, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1143, 1153 (203) (arguing that the
JOBS Act allows companies to remain private longer at the expense of investor protection).
5 See JAMEs D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 154-55 (7th
ed. 2013). "Beating the gun" was the phrase more often used to describe similar behavior before 1933
and in the first decades after the passage of federal securities laws. See Louis Loss, SECURITIES
REGULATION 194 (2d ed. 1961) [hereinafter LOSS 2D ED.]. Paul Mahoney describes pre-933 practice
by selling agents to avoid similar bans (arising from private ordering rather than statutes) by the
underwriting syndicates of the day. See Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy ofthe Securities Act
ofx933,30 J. LEGAL STUD. I, 14 (2001).
6 Seasoned equity offerings pose a different set of questions because the issuer raising capital
is already publicly traded and is thus familiar to the marketplace. See Cox ET AL., Supra note 5,
at 178-89. The evolution of the public offering for larger, seasoned issuers is mainly about "shelf
registration." Id. at 189-97. The demise of Section 5 in this context is even greater, but implicates
an entirely different set of issues. Increasingly, seasoned issuer offerings are quite different in
execution from IPOs. See generally Todd Hamblet & Nora Gibson, Confidentially Marketed Public
Offerings:Let's Get Technical, 45 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1303 (July 15, 2013) (discussing the use of
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We describe this as a slow death because it began almost as soon as the Act
was passed. As we shall see in Part I, Section 5 started as a simple, rigid, and
coherent rule that limited sales efforts to the time after the SEC had declared
the registration statement "effective."The industry found this impracticable and
to some extent just ignored it, setting in motion two decades of negotiations as
to a proper balance between the demand for pre-effective--date marketing and
the concerns about gun-jumping. A legislative compromise, eventually reached
in 1954, gave us the statutory language that is mostly still with us today. The
1954 amendments created the three distinct time periods in a registered public
offering that beginning securities law students stili struggle to master: the
pre-filing period during which offers and sales were forbidden;' the waiting
period during which oral (but not written) offers were allowed;' and the
post-effective period, where sales occur and final prospectuses are delivered.9
For many decades, however, this compromise had considerable bite.
It generated what we call the quiet period, during which issuers and underwriters
had to limit severely what they said outside of the statutory prospectus (and
how and when they might say it) if the communication might in any way
"whet the appetite" of investors and thus be an illegal offer.'o Gradually, quiet
period practices emerged that put pressure on Section 5's awkward distinctions,
especially as between oral and written communications. In response to these
and other concerns in a time of rapid technological evolution," the SEC acted
in 2005 to thoroughly restructure the public offering environment through an
extensive set of rule-based exemptions and safe harbors (the "2005 reforms").12
Section 5 lost much of its bite as a result.'I In subtle and striking ways that have
thus far received mostly superficial analysis, the recent JOBS Act cut back even
more with respect to most IPOs.14
confidentially marketed public offerings in lieu of traditional initial public offerings).
7 COX ET AL., supra nOte 5, at 55-64.
8 Id at 164-74.
9 Id. at 174-78.
lo See Eric A. Chiappineli, Gun Jumping: The Problem ofExtraneous Offers of Securities, 50 U.
PITT. L. REV. 457 (1989) (discussing the types of illegals offers that might arouse the public interest).
n1 Lurking in the background of these reforms are the First Amendment implications of
Section 5, which operates as a form of prior restraint and might seem vulnerable to attack. See
Susan B. Heyman, The Quiet Period in a Noisy World: Rethinking Securities Regulation and Corporate
Free Speech, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 189, 211-2 (2013); Joseph A. Grundfest, Regulation FD in the Age
of Facebook and Twitter: Should the SEC Sue Netlix? 3-5 (Stanford Univ. Rock Ctr. for Corp.
Governance Working Paper Series, Paper No. 131, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=220 95 25.
12 Securities Offering Reform, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act Release No.
52,056, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722 (Aug. 3, 2005) (to be
codified at 17 C.FR. pts. 200, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240, 243, 249, & 274) [hereinafter 2005 Release].
13 For a highly critical exploration, see Joseph Morrissey, Rhetoric and Reality: Investor
Protection and the Securities Regulation Reform of2005, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 56, (2007).
14 The JOBS Act changes on which we focus are in the form of revised procedures easing the
regulatory obligations for public offerings by "emerging growth companies." The Jumpstart Our
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Our aim here is to document all this, and assess the current state of Section
5's fragile health. To document and assess is not necessarily to criticize. The
compromise reflected in Section 5 was conceptually incoherent from the
beginning, and tied to an understanding of the public offering process that
quickly became outdated. Perhaps the quiet period was not that good an idea in
the first place, or the markets have changed enough to demand a new regulatory
regime."
In Part II,we turn to a brief survey of the contemporary literature in financial
economics on IPOs. Legal scholars have paid attention to certain aspects of
the economics of public offerings, particularly the persistent underpricing
that occurs and the abuses that ensue in allocating scarce shares.'" But by and
large, the prevailing view of Section 5 among lawyers still seems rooted in an
overly simplistic and archaic impression of the offering process. The persistence
of book-building as the standard mechanism for U.S. (and to a large extent
global) public offerings, and the value embedded in it of facilitating the flow
of information from the purchasers to the underwriter and visa versa, reveals a
complex negotiation between underwriters and institutional buyers that helps
explain much of what is happening prior to the effective date of the registration
statement, from which we can learn a great deal.
Our principal claim in Part II is that the demise of Section 5's communication
rules is best understood as an embrace of book-building, facilitating the
two-way communication process on which that practice depends. But we also
consider what might have been lost in this remarkable transformation of the
selling rules. Because book-building involves communications with presumably
sophisticated institutional investors, it becomes easy to doubt that there is
much if any need for protection at all. Yet, the finance literature also stresses the
complex interplay between these institutional negotiations and the stimulation
of largely retail investor-driven demand in the secondary trading market, which
was once clearly within Section 5's constraint but is less so after deregulation.
Business Startups (JOBS) Act, Pub. L. No. 112-Io6, 1z6 Stat. 306 (2012) (to be codified in scattered
sections of IS U.S.C.), does much more than this, and these other reforms have received more
careful attention. For our analyses, see Donald C. Langevoort & Robert B. Thompson, 'Publicness"
in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, io GEo. L. 337 (2013) (discussing public
offerings in the post-JOBS Act environment); Thompson & Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-
Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial Capital Raising, supra note 4.
is See James D. Cox, Premises for Reforming the Regulation of Securities Offerings: An Essay, 63
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. II, II-I2 (2000).
16 E.g., Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public Offering, 26 CARDOzo L. REV.
7Hz, 714-5 (2005); Sean Griffith, Spinning and Underpricing: A Legal and Economic Analysis of the
Preferential Allocation of Shares in Initial Public Offerings, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 583, 589-90 (2004);
Therese H. Maynard, Spinning in a Hot IPO: Breach ofFiduciary Duty or Business as Usual? 43 Wm.
& MARY L. REV. 2023 (2002). The perceived abuses coming out of all this have become the subject
of SEC and Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) rulemaking, as well as extensive
class action litigation. See Cox ET AL., supra note 5, at 135-36.
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To assess whether investors are better off or not as a result, we turn to two
main justifications that have been given for the deregulation. The first is that
any loss in prophylactic protection can be made up for by the threat of liability,
particularly with an enhanced Section 12(a)(2). We find this unpersuasive
for a variety of reasons. The second-amply visible in the long history of
Section 5-is a faith in the "filtration" process: that retail investors gain
protection because of the availability of the preliminary prospectus during the
waiting period to those involved in the selling process if not to the investors
themselves. Here again we are not entirely convinced, as we explain in Part III.
Putting aside the biased incentives that affect filtration, much of what is
most important-and conveyed privately to the institutions in the course of
book-building-is forward-looking information that probably need not
appear in the formal disclosure, whether preliminary or final. None of this is an
argument for returning to the old prophylactics of Section 5. But it is cause for
the SEC and FINRA to pay closer attention to the retail investor effects of the
IPO sales process, especially in the post-JOBS Act era.
Before we begin, some basics are in order for those not especially familiar
with public offerings." An issuer seeking to raise capital in a public offering
must first prepare and file a detailed disclosure document with the SEC, called
the registration statement, and then await the SEC staff's approval before
actually selling the securities. When satisfied that disclosure is adequate and
selling can begin, the staff declares the registration statement "effective." The
document that conveys the required information to investors (taken directly
from the registration statement) is the statutory prospectus, which has both a
preliminary and final form.
IPOs in the United States are generally done on a fixed-price basis.
Roughly at the same time of the effective date, the issuer sells the entire
amount of newly-issued securities at a discount to a syndicate of underwriters,
who-directly or through other dealers-then quickly turn around and resell to
investors at the price set forth in the registration statement, a process referred
to as a firm-commitment underwriting. The investors who purchase directly
from the syndicate will ordinarily be a mix of institutional investors (mutual
funds, pension funds, etc.) and "retail" investors (households and individuals
of varying degrees of sophistication), but usually more the former than the
latter. Contemporaneous with the public offering the issuer will typically list its
securities on a securities exchange, so that secondary trading of the newly issued
securities begins immediately. Investors who were not allocated shares by the
underwriters in the initial round can thus acquire shares on the open market,
albeit at the market price prevailing at the time of their purchase rather than at
17 For fiu-ther elaboration on this brief overview, see generally CoX ET AL., supra note 5, at
107-248 (examining the demands of Section 5 on the sale of securities), and CHARLES J. JOHNSON,
JR. & JOSEPH McLAUGHLIN, CORPORATE FINANCE AND THE SECURITIES LAws (4th ed. zoto &
Supp. 2012).
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the fixed price.Their sellers will be investors who received initial allocations and
quickly "flip" those shares or underwriters who may sell to stabilize the price.'"
Book-building is the effort that occurs prior to the effective date, mainly
during the waiting period, as the underwriters negotiate over offering terms
with sophisticated institutional investors who are key potential investors. What
they learn in these negotiations helps them set the offering price, the economics
of-which we will consider in Part II.There we will see that the offering price will
deliberately be set below what the market is likely to demand when secondary
trading begins after the effective date.
I. SECTION 5's RESTRAINTS ON MARKETING:
A DEVOLUTION IN FOUR ACTS
The Securities Act of 1933 radically changed the legal structure governing
how securities are sold in this country, first requiring that the fill story about
the company and its securities be told through the medium of a registration
statement (and its statutory prospectus), and second, blocking alternative
channels of communication that might distort or preempt the statutorily
required story. The last eighty years in some ways can be seen as a long retreat
from the stark language of the statute's prohibition against communication, a
story that divides into four distinct regulatory eras.
While the deregulatory direction is unmistakable, we see changes that show
a more nuanced approach through all four eras attuned to broader themes of
how information gets to investors and the price discovery that goes on in a
pre-selling of IPOs where communication between market makers and
potential buyers can be seen as aiding investor protection. That does not mean
that the balance is not difficult and that the government may be yielding to
political and industry pressure as to deregulatory changes, but it does require a
more detailed analysis.
A. The Ban on Communications (and Selling) Before the Effective Date
Under the Original 1933 Template
President Franklin Roosevelt, in proposing securities legislation to the
Congress in the first month of his administration, set out a goal to "put[] the
burden of telling the whole truth on the seller."" The President's message also
highlighted concern about high-pressure sales tactics that had produced "severe
losses through practices neither ethical nor honest on the part of many persons
and corporations selling securities."20 A prominent study of securities markets
described sales tactics designed "to induce customers to buy, rather than to
A8 For a period of time after the start of trading, the underwriters will take steps to assure that
the market price of the securities stays at or-preferably-above the fixed offering price.
19 S. REP. No. 73-47, at 6-7 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
20 S. REP. No. 73-47, at 6 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at i (1933).
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inform them. . . .'he guiding principles and the devices were those which had
been successfully employed in the field of advertising and salesmanship."21 The
heart of the '33 Act was Section 5(a) with its two, broad prohibitions. First,
no security could be sold unless a registration statement was in effect with the
extensive disclosure about a company and its securities required by the Act.22
Second, sales effort by other means were banned until that filing had been
reviewed by a federal agency and declared effective.2 3
In the first two decades under the '33 Act, industry practices quickly
pushed beyond the seemingly bright-line prohibition on selling efforts before
the effective date of a registration statement while early agency regulators
focused on distinguishing those communications that were helpful to investors
(those that were "prospectus-like") and those that were worrisome (those
that indicated hardcore selling). From the beginning it was clear the new
law did not ban all communications by the issuer or underwriters. Face-to-
face communications or other exchanges that did not take place via a means
of interstate commerce were not covered. The Federal Trade Commission,
charged with administering the new act during its first year, quickly declared
(as suggested by the House Committee report) that issuers could distribute
circulars "clearly and unmistakably marked [as] ... informative only, negativing
without equivocation either impliedly or expressly an intent to solicit offers to
buy or to make an offer to sell ... ."24 This introduced a conceptual dilemma of
distinguishing between communication and solicitation that Professor Louis
Loss said was to "plague[] both the Commission and industry for twenty-one
years" (i.e. until the 1954 amendments).25
During this first era, the SEC (to whom the administration of the Act
was transferred in 1934 after that agency's formation) focused its efforts on
adaptations of the Section 10 prospectus that would be permissible prior to the
effective date of the registration statement. General Counsel opinions issued in
1935 and 1936 supported industry use of what would become the "red herring"
21 TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC.,THE SECURITY MARKETs 566-67 (1935).
22 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (20z2) (prohibiting the sale or delivery of securities unless a registration
statement is in effect). For the material required in a registration statement, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 7, so,
Schedule A (2012).
23 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (1953) (prohibiting an offer to sell or offer to buy, defined to include
communications broadly, unless a registration statement is in effect).This language was moved into
a new Section 5(c) in 1954 and made applicable only to the period before the filing of a registration
statement. See infra note 48. After the effective date, sales communications could occur by free
writing so long as the final prospectus had already been sent or given to the person receiving the
communication or accompanied the communication. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(io) (2012), exempting
free writing from the definition of "prospectus" after the effective date, and removing these
communications from Section 5 (b)'s otherwise blanket ban on the use of any prospectus that did
not meet the requirements of Section so. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b) (2012).
24 Letter of Federal Trade Commission Relating to Offers of Sale Prior to the Effective Date
of the Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 70, I Fed. Reg. ro,912, io,948 (Sept. 27,
1946) (originally published Nov. 6,1933); see H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 12-13 (1933).
25 Loss 2D ED., supra note 5, at 187.
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prospectus and "blue card" summaries of prospectuses.2 6 The first refers to the
red legend added to the communication disaffirming any intent to offer to
sell and the second to five-by-eight inch cards summarizing the registration
statement materials sold by Standard & Poor's to underwriters and dealers for
their circulation among customers.27
Clearly the SEC contemplated that the information in the registration
statement would be circulated during the waiting period.28 James Landis, one
of the principal drafters of the statute and the Commission's second chair,
described the introduction of the "completely novel" concept of the waiting
period in Section 5 as providing the opportunity "for the financial world to
acquaint itself with the basic data underlying a security issue and through
that acquaintance to circulate among the buying public as well as independent
dealers some intimation of its quality."29 The contemplated "acquaintance"
necessarily was of an indirect or filtration variety. The actual delivery of the
prospectus to purchasers was (and remains today) only required by statute with
the delivery of the stock certificate or the confirmation of sale, which would not
occur until after the investor was legally bound to the contract.3 0
The process by which this transmission of information was to occur was not
entirely clear. Loss described it as an apparent expectation that underwriters
and dealers would "disseminate information without in any way puffing [their]
wares," a seemingly naive assumption negated by the fact that "salesmen are
not educators, and the concept of a reluctant salesman soon proved to be as
26 1936 Letter of General Counsel, Securities Act Release No. 802, ii Fed. Reg. 10,912, 10,957
(Sept. 27, 1946) (originally published May 23, 1936); 1935 Letter of General Counsel, Securities Act
Release No. 464, iI Fed. Reg. 1o,912,10,953 (Sept. 27, 1946) (originally published Aug.19, 1935).
27 See I Louis Loss, JOEL SELIGMAN & TROY PAREDES, SECURITIES REGULATION 6II-I2
(4 th ed. 2006) [hereinafter Loss ET AL. 4TH ED.]. Other related actions during this first period
include: (i) the SEC's April 1945 statement of policy that it would not accelerate the effective date
of a registration statement if an inaccurate red herring prospectus had been circulated and not
corrected; (ii) the promulgation of Rule 131 in December 1946 that a red herring was not generally
an offer; and (iii) the promulgation of Rule 132 in October 1952 providing that a brief identifying
statement, which covered no more than sixteen specified topics, would not be considered an offer in
the SEC's attendant statement of its acceleration policy. See Statement of Commission Respecting
Acceleration Policy, Securities Act Release No. 3453, 17 Fed. Reg. 8900, 8900 (Oct. 1, 1952).
28 Loss 2D ED., supra note 5, at 187 ("Although any form of pre-effective solicitation by use
of the mails or interstate facilities was categorically forbidden, the whole theory of the waiting
period was that the information contained in the registration statement would be disseminated so
that the investing public would be able to make an intelligent determination whether to buy when
the statement became effective."); James J. Caffrey, Chairman, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Address
at Dinner in Honor of National Association of Securities Administrators: The Dissemination of
Information Under the Securities Act 3 (Sept. 27, 1946), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
speech/1946/092746caffrey.pdf (discussing red herring prospectuses and noting "we have from
the earliest days recognized that getting reliable information out to the public during the waiting
period was part of the fundamental policy of the law.").
29 James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 29,35 (0960).
30 15 U.S.C. §7 7e(b)(2) (2012).
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chimerical as the dream of a nation without a thirst."3' Much of the SEC's
efforts, both in this period and after 1954, seemed focused on creating
incentives for issuers to distribute the material in the final prospectus before
the time for delivery specified in the statute. The statute, from its origin, has
permitted free writing after the effective date once the investor has received
the final prospectus.32 The SEC pursued a number of avenues in the pre-1954
period that would have permitted sales efforts prior to the effective date if there
were a red herring prospectus, identifying statements, or other communications
providing all or almost all ofthe information that would be the final prospectus."
In a legislative process cut off by the advent of World War II, the SEC staff
proposed legalizing the red herring selling effort if, as a condition precedent,
the investors'received a statutory prospectus before committing to the sale.3 4 By
the time the discussion resumed after the war, the SEC staff had let go of the
condition precedent while accepting the legal recognition of the red herring.
Even then, the SEC chair floated the possibility of conditioning acceleration
of a registration statement on all prospective and actual selling group members
receiving a red herring prospectus, a filtration-encouraging requirement that
made its way into later rules.3 s Professor Loss, a participant in those SEC
staff discussions as a senior staff attorney, concluded that recognizing the red
herring prospectus for the selling document it is was "a decided improvement
in the investor's protection even without his being guaranteed a prospectus for
a minimum period in advance of his commitment." 6
Yet, testimony at hearings for the 1954 legislation reveals that the ordinary
non-institutional investors "hardly ever" saw a red herring prospectus or an
identifying statement. 7 The larger issue, which was already visible in this first
period, was the ability of issuers to do the selling they needed without the final
prospectus or the red herring/identifying statement alternatives, something
they could do by oral communications that was unregulated by the '33 Act.
Professor Loss pointed to the "inability or the unwillingness of the Commission
31 Loss 2D ED., supra note 5, at 187.
32 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(io) (2o2) (excluding free writing from definition of "prospectus" after
the effective date).
33 See Loss 2D ED., supra note 5, at 187-93.
34 Id. at 199-201. Loss describes the industry's response: permit sales immediately upon the
effective date, subject to an investor's right to rescission in the day after the sale if the purchaser had
not received the final prospectus before the sale. Id. at 200.
35 Caffrey, supra note 28, at 6. This later became part of Securities Act Release No. 4968. See
Prior Delivery of Preliminary Prospectus, Securities Act Release No. 4968,34 Fed. Reg. 7235 (Apr.
24, 1969); see also Loss 2D ED., supra note 5, at 200 ("[T]he theory was that the very imposition of
the twenty-four-hour requirement would act as a powerful incentive to dissemination of statutory
prospectuses during the waiting period.").
36 Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 255 (ist ed. 1951) [hereinafter Loss IST ED.].
37 Amending SecuritiesAct ofr933, Securities ExchangeAct of934, Trust IndentureAct of1939, and
Investment Company Act of19o: Hearing on H. 755o and S. 2846 Before the Comm. on Interstate &
Foreign Commerce, 83 rd Cong. 149-50, 158 (1954). See also Loss 2D ED., supra note 5, at 193.
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effectively to enforce the prohibition against pre-effective oral solicitation by
means of interstate telephone" calls as a difficulty with the pre-1954 statute.3 1
Prior to the passage of the '54 amendments, he described this practice as "so
prevalent, [that] there is real danger that an important feature of the Securities
Act," the ban on communications that is our focus, "will become another
Prohibition law."3 1
Why then would the SEC be willing to agree to a legislative change in
1954 that accepted more selling (not just in red herrings, but also in oral
communications) without getting actual delivery of the statutory prospectus
before the investor made the purchase decision? Perhaps it was due to a change
in the political climate. This was the first time since the passage of the Securities
Act of 1933 that Republicans controlled both the White House and the
Congress. Yet the core decision on this point had been made years before when
appointees of Roosevelt and Truman still controlled the Commission.40 When
the Eisenhower administration did arrive, it focused more on budget restraint
than on seeking deregulatory changes in the securities laws.41 The Republican
SEC chairman termed the '54 legislation "modest housekeeping" changes and
could not recall "'any serious discussion' of substantive legislative initiatives
at the SEC during his chairmanship."42 Alternatively, it could have been an
adjustment in the SEC's attitude toward filtration. Professor Loss suggested
that the Commission and its staff in 1941 and 1947 may have put too much
emphasis on the prospectus as the principal tool of the disclosure philosophy,
pointing instead to "other statutory and administrative reforms which might
make for a greater measure of pre-commitment disclosure indirectly."43 It
seems more likely that what we see is some recognition of the trade-off between
investor protection and selling that carried into the later periods. It was not just
a trust in filtration and markets to sufficiently transmit the information that
had been given to the SEC, but recognition of the value of information going
the other way from purchasers to underwriters.
In discussing underwriters' use of oral solicitation at a time that selling
was banned by statute, Professor Loss describes the practice as based on the
underwriters'conviction (and adds, "perhaps correctly so") that "it was essential
to the fulfillment of their function, at least if it was to be done with reasonable
safety, that they 'test the market' before committing themselves."" Here is the
38 LOSS 2D ED., Supra note 5, at 194.
39 Loss IST ED., supra note 36, at 255.
40 Loss IST ED., supra note 36, at 251 ("After five years this difference [referring to the
Commission's and the industry's views in the 1941-42 period discussed above] no longer seemed
so vital.").
41 JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 267 (3d ed. 2003) (describing
the drop in the number of SEC staff).
42 Id. at 271-72.
43 Loss 2D ED.,supra note 5, at 203.
44 Id. at 194. The "perhaps correctly so"was an addition to Loss's second edition, published in
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precursor to the book-building argument that did not make its way into the
legal literature for decades into the future. Underwriters, who were buying from
the issuer and taking the risk of the uncertainty as to the price at which they
could resale an issue for which there was no pre-existing market information,
wanted to communicate with buyers before they committed to a purchase price
with the issuer. Underwriters did this orally, seeking indications of interest that
were not legally binding and relying on reputation to make the process work
for both sides.45
Professor Paul Mahoney notes that none of the prohibitions on
communications were necessary in order to achieve the simple goal of requiring
full disclosure. He prefers a rent-seeking explanation as the source of the ban
on communications and points to the origins of "beating the gun" concerns in
the 1920s before there were any federal securities laws, when syndicates sought
to ban selling efforts prior to an agreed upon date:
While traditionally described as mere pieces of the technical apparatus of
'full disclosure,' these provisions imposed important limitations on both
retail and wholesale competition .... [that are] best understood as a means
of eliminating several specific competitive techniques that low-status
securities dealers used successfully against high-status dealers in the late
1920s and early 1930s.'
If such rent-seeking occurred, it was quickly undercut by industry
participants occupying the still evolving regulatory space in the immediate
aftermath of the passage of the '33 Act; these underwriters and dealers were
asserting the legitimacy of communications practices seemingly banned by the
language of the '33 Act discussed above, and aggressively negotiated with the
Commission over two decades to shape the law contrary to the initial statute.
The result reflected greater space for selling (and price discovery) prior to
the effective date, with more practical safeguards against high-pressure sales
codified into the 1954 amendments.
B. Oral Communications and Broadened "Prospectus-Like" Communications
Sanctioned by the 1954 Amendments
With the 1954 legislative amendments, which remains the applicable
statutory language still applicable today, the categorical ban on communications
receded entirely from the waiting period and only applied to the pre-filing
1961. In the first edition, published in 1951, then-SEC lawyer Loss quoted an SEC commissioner's
characterization of the underwriters'action as "probably not with their hearts in their mouths, but
doubtless with their tongues in their cheeks." Loss IST ED., Supra note 36, at 161 (quoting Comm'r
Robert K. McConnaughey, Address at Amos Tuck School of Business Administration, Dartmouth
College (Jan. 22, 1948)). See also Nathan D. Lobell, Revision ofthe Securities Act, 48 COLUM. L. REV.
313, 320 (1948) (arguing that gun jumping stemmed from the desire of underwriters to limit the
period of their risk of less than full distribution).
45 Loss 2D ED., supra note 5, at 194.
46 Mahoney, supra note 5, at 3.
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period.47 The waiting period was opened to oral communication, and greater
written communication was permitted through a preliminary prospectus, the
summary prospectus, tombstone ads, and an identifying statement. 48
In the aftermath of the amendments, which provided new freedom for
selling activities prior to the effective date, the regulatory focus shifted to the
perils of high pressure selling prior to the filing of the registration statement
and the use of mass media to do so. Speeches by SEC commissioners discussed
appropriate factors governing efforts to root out communications that would
frustrate the purpose of the securities laws. 49 In late 1957, the Commission
issued a release with ten examples that found its way into law school casebooks
for decades to come. The release clearly described its motivation as an effort to
overcome what "apparently is not generally understood":
[T]hat the publication of information and statements, and publicity efforts,
generally, made in advance ofa proposed financing, although not couched in
terms of an express offer, may in fact contribute to conditioning the public
mind or arousing public interest in the issuer or in the securities of an issuer
in a manner which raises a serious question whether the publicity is not in
fact part of the selling effort. 0
In the fall of 1958, the Commission brought its first gun-jumping
proceeding since the 1954 changes.5' An underwriter's publicizing of the
Arvida Corporation's land developments plans that would be the basis of the
issuer's public offering was criticized for only presenting the positive side of
the development plans. The Commission's formal opinion, which followed the
settlement of an injunction case and dismissal of an administrative proceeding,
cited the direction in the Congressional Committee Report accompanying
47 Language from Section 5(a) was moved to (c). See Chiappinelli, supra note io, at 459-60.
48 The original language banning offers to sell has categorical language ("by prospectus or
otherwise") that would sweep in oral communications as well as written communications that
occurred by means of interstate commerce. In 1954 that language was simply shifted from (a) (where
it had applied to the pre-effective period) to a new subsection (c) where it only applied to the
pre-filing period. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c) (2012). That shift left Section 5(b)(i) to regulate selling
efforts during the waiting period, and its language was not as broad, only applying to "prospectus"
with no mention of "or otherwise." See 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(i) (2012). Since "prospectus" is limited in
Section 2(a)(io) to only written and not oral communications, oral offers after 1954 are unregulated.
See s U.S.C. § 77b(bo) (2012).
49 See Edward N. Gadsby, Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address Before the
Investment Bankers Association Annual Convention: Gun-Jumping Problems Under Section 5
of the Securities Act of 1933, at 8 (Dec. 3, 1958) (explaining companies do not have to close PR
departments); Andrew Downey Orrick, Acting Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Address Before
the Security Analysts of San Francisco: Certain Assumptions and Interpretations of the Securities
and Exchange Commission S (July 17, 1957) (discussing "thinly veiled attempt[s]").
50 Publication of Information Prior to or After the Effective Date of a Release Statement,
Securities Act Release No. 3844, 22 Fed. Reg. 8359 (Oct. 4,1957)-
51 SEC v. Arvida Corp., 169 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1958). There had been only three SEC
actions regarding gun jumping prior to 1954 and only one that would fit the post-1954 structure,
which focused on conditioning the market during the pre-filing period. See LOSS 2D ED., supra note
5, at 195-97
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the 1954 legislation for the SEC to be "ever vigilant" to prevent evasion of
the basic statutory approach of full disclosure.5 2 This sentiment continued
to guide SEC policy for decades and is visible in the Google IPO in 2004
when the founders' interview, published in Playboy magazine shortly before
filing, threatened to derail the company's IPO because of concern about a
gun-jumping communication.s"
In the period after Arvida, the SEC's focus shifted to make room for
increasing information coming into the marketplace under disclosures required
by the 1934 Act and to permit information directed toward customers, suppliers,
and employees.5 4 The Wheat Report in 1969 expressed the concern that
gun-jumping had unnecessarily interfered with normal publication activities
of companies.s' Thereafter, the Commission amended existing rules and added
several new rules liberalizing communications.5 6 The changes reflected the
Commission's belief that "widespread market following greatly lessens the
potential for abuse Section 5 was intended to prevent."17 The specific context was
the integrated disclosure system's impact on securities issuance by companies
that were already within the disclosure requirements of the 1934 Act, but the
changes also reflected acceptance of the impact of market disclosures and the
greater role of institutional investors on initial public offerings, particularly as
technology opened up more channels for information through the internet and
other electronic communications.
During this period, the SEC continued its prior efforts to more broadly
disseminate the required disclosure of the final prospectus. Its 1970
promulgation of Rule 15c2-8 comes as close as securities law has ever come
to requiring that investors actually receive a copy of the full story in the
statutory prospectus prior to making the decision to buy.s This rule requires
52 In re Carl M. Loeb, Rhoades & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 5870, 3 8 S.E.C. 843 (Feb.
9, 1959).
53 See Eric Schmidt, How I Did It: Google's CEO on the Enduring Lessons of a Quirky IPO,
HARv. Bus. REV., May 2010, at io8, III (explaining how the Playboy interview "almost derailed the
whole IPO").The solution, adding the interview as an appendix to the SEC filing, fullfilled the full
disclosure part of Section 5 without any apparent cooling-off period that might address concerns
over conditioning the market.
54 See, e.g., 17 C.ER. § 230.169 (2013).
55 SEC. AND ExcH. Comm'N, DISCLOSURE TO INVESTORS: A REAPPRAISAL OF FEDERAL
ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES UNDER THE 33 AND'34 SECURITIES ACTS 127 (1969).
56 Publication of Information and Delivery of Prospectus by Broker-Dealers Prior to or
After the Filing of a Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No. 5So1, 35 Fed. Reg. 18,443,
18,456-57 (Dec. 4,1970) (amending Rule 135 and adopting Rules 137-139).
57 Securities Act Release No. 66492, 28 SEC Docket 1257, 126o-6I (1983).
58 Publication of Information and Delivery of Prospectus by Broker-Dealers Prior to or
After the Filing of a Registration Statement, Securities Act Release No- 51o1, 35 Fed. Reg. t8,443,
18,456-57 (Dec. 4, 197o). The awkwardness of the SEC's approach to fill disclosure is captured in
the round-about way this new obligation was imposed-not as part of a '33 Act rule addressing
the distribution of securities but rather under a'34 Act section relating to regulation of brokers and
dealers.
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broker-dealers to deliver a copy of the preliminary prospectus to any person
expected to receive a confirmation of sale at least forty-eight hours prior to the
anticipated mailing of a confirmation.s
Industry practices continued to develop in the space outside of the regulated
channels of communication. Road shows permitted issuers and the selling group
to both sell and get feedback from potential purchasers about their interest and
the price they would be willing to pay.60 When advances in communications
technology permitted road show presentations to be distributed to those that
could not be physically present, the SEC deemed these communications not be
a prospectus.61
The finance literature was quicker than the legal literature to connect
these changes in communications policy to book building and the economic
function of price discovery in the IPO process, with the underwriter acting
as a reputational intermediary between issuers and investors as discussed in
Part 11.62 While there remains debate in the finance and legal community about
the reach of these theories, the unwillingness of the SEC to implement a broad
ban on communication reflects recognition of the value of price discovery.
Underpricing is a more visible illustration of this tension between
communications and the process of price discovery in the IPO context.
Although there were a couple of isolated references to underpricing in the legal
literature as far back as the 1940s, it was not until the mid 1980s that law
scholars provided detailed treatment of the topic." Some of the discussion of
this era tracked the idea put forward earlier of the underwriter's risk in making
a market that can be reduced by underpricing, with some focus on underwriters
were taking advantage of the process."4 Even so, the legal literature was well
behind the finance discussion of book-building and underpricing's relation to
the underwriter's price discovery process. 6s
59 17 C.F.R. § 24 o.i5c2-8(b) (2013). Other parts of the rule also require brokers and dealers to
take reasonable steps to comply with written requests for the preliminary or final prospectus and to
those expected to solicit customer orders. Id.
60 See Bro Uttal, Inside the Deal that Made Bill Gates s3oooo,ooo, FORTUNE, July z1, 1986,
at 23, 32 (describing six big investors threatening to 'uncircle'- to remove [themselves] from
Goldman Sachs's list" two days before the deal became effective, and explaining that "Chicago and
Baltimore were fraying at the edges,"but West coast investors stood firm and the IPO went public
at Goldman's promised target price of s21.).
61 See, e.g., Exploration, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 1986 WL 67374 (Nov. 11, 1986).
62 See, e.g., William J. Wilhelm, Jr., Bookbuilding, Auctions, and the Future ofthe IPO Process, 17
J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 2,5 (2005)-
63 See Barbara Ann Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies, Efficient Markets, and ShelfRegistration: An
Analysis ofRule 415, 7o VA. L. REV. 135, 152 n.82 (1984) (collecting studies and commentaries, and
discussing underwriter incentives to underprice); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, 7he
Mechanisms ofMarketEfficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 621 n.197 (1984) (same).
64 See Banoff supra note 63, at 152.
65 See discussion infra Part II.
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C. The 2005 Reforms
By the turn of the century, many accommodations had been made to the
practicalities of book-building, but the 1954 revisions were still amply visible
in establishing the basic regulatory framework for IPOs. Gun-jumping liability
remained a significant threat, at least as enforced (with considerable discretion)
by the SEC staff. In 2005, however, there was something of a revolution.
The 2005 reforms were decades in the making, largely driven by the
frustration of applying the stringent public offering rules to seasoned issuers
when so much information is already available about them as a result of their
public company status under the Securities Exchange Act.66 Fortunately we
can ignore most of these reforms for our discussion, either because they do
not apply to IPOs or, even if they do, because they do not involve Section 5's
communication rules.
Two major changes, however, did significantly affect the IPO
process-one for the pre-filing period, the other post-filing. New Rule 163A
created a limited thirty-day window prior to the filing of the registration
statement during which the quiet period attaches; offering communications by
the issuer (not underwriters or dealers) before that time are excluded from the
definition of offer, and hence from the prohibition in Section 5(c). 67 In other
words, the duration ofthe pre-filing period is shortened considerably, and issuers
are free to "hype" until the appointed time so long as their communications do
not reference the forthcoming public offering and efforts are made to assure
that the publicity is not repeated within the thirty-day period.6 1
The SEC's explanation was that hyping that occurs more than thirty days
out is unlikely to have an ongoing conditioning effect on investors by the time
they make their decisions to buy.69 While the Commission is no doubt right
that publicity's effects do dissipate over time, we can at least wonder whether
concerted efforts to create a buzz about a company and its prospects have
lingering effects in terms of follow up, word-of-mouth, journalistic coverage,
etc. It may be naive to think that publicity that whets the appetite of potential
investors ceases to have that effect so quickly. Even though there is the
prohibition on referencing the forthcoming offering, the issuer has the freedom
to make such an announcement separately pursuant to long-standing Rule 135
and the market for IPOs can then easily make the connection.7 0
'The other major reform affecting IPO communications-one of the
headline changes in the 2005 revisions-was the authorization for the issuer
66 2005 Release, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act Release No. 52,o56, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,724.
67 17 C.ER. § 23 o.i63A (2013).
68 7 C.F.R. § 230.I63A(a).
69 2005 Release, Securities Act Release No.859 1, Exchange Act Release No. 52,056, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,74o.
70 17 C.F.R. § 230.135 (2013).
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and offering participants to use "free writing prospectuses" ("FWP") after the
filing of a registration statement containing a bona fide expected price range."
FWPs are written marketing material of any sort-e-mails, term sheets, sales
literature, or media publicity.72 'he relevant safe harbor rules (Rules 164 and
433) are mind-numbingly complicated but boil down to three possible avenues
of compliance, depending on who is responsible for the material and how or to
whom it is communicated: (1) the inclusion of a legend warning readers that
a prospectus is or will be available and should be read; (2) attachment of the
most recent preliminary prospectus, which may be via hyperlink for electronic
materials; and (3) filing with the SEC.3 This is truly "free writing" in that there
are no limitations on what can be said or how it can be communicated, so long
as there is no inconsistency with what is in the registration statement.
This is a vast oversimplification of the FWP regime,7 4 but enough for our
purposes. What is amply clear is the SEC had abandoned its 1954 philosophy
that had tried to make the preliminary prospectus and similar documents
the only written communications containing the kind of information that
could make an investor want to purchase up until the effective date. The new
philosophy was one of free communication (albeit with some combination of
the three conditions) of whatever the offering participants want to say, so long as
the best available prospectus is could counter any overly optimistic implications
from the FWPs.
The SEC was unapologetic about this profound change, making clear that
the passage of time and evolution in information technology had made the old
oral/written distinction both anachronistic and unwise." This reform unleashed
opportunities for much more aggressive selling efforts during the waiting
period. Acknowledging this, the Commission said that any excesses should be
curbed, not by prior restraint, but by the threat of liability if what is said in the
FWP is actually false or misleading." To this end, the 2005 reforms revised
the liability rules under Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act, a provision that
allows purchasers to recover against their sellers if sales are made negligently,
by means of a false or misleading prospectus or oral communication.7 7 Notably,
the reforms purported to expand issuer liability, even when the issuer is a step
71 17 C.ER. § 230.164.
72 17 C.F.R. § 230.405.
73 See V C.F.R. § 230.164; 17 C.F.R. § 230.433.
74 For more, see Cox ET AL., supra note 5, at 167-7o.
75 See 2005 Release, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act Release No. 52,056,
Investment Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,744.
76 See Rachel McTague, Securities Lawyer Predicts Success for Forthcoming SEC Offering Rule
Proposals, 36 SEc. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1894 (Oct. 25, 2004) (citations omitted) (quoting Alan
Beller, the Director of the Division of Corporation Finance, as saying that "so long as there are
liability standards for material misstatements and material omissions in all written statements,
the restrictions on written communications should not have to be as tight as they currently are").
77 17 C.F.R. § 23 0.159 A (2053) (defining "seller" to include an issuer offering or selling by
means of a free writing prospectus prepared by or on behalf of the issuer or used by the issuer).
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or two removed from the plaintiff-purchaser." We will come back to all this
in Part III.
We will turn soon to whether all this is good policy or not. For now, simply
appreciate the extraordinary turn away from the statutory structure created in
1954. Until 2005, the IPO lawyer's job was often simply to say no to an issuer
or underwriter that wanted to promote the forthcoming offering in a way that
ran afoul of Sections 5(b) or 5(c)-any selling efforts before filing, and written
solicitations afterwards. Now, except in the brief thirty-day window prior to
filing, the desired selling efforts could occur, with the lawyer simply assessing
whether the communication needed a legend or attachment, had to be filed, or
was false or misleading. The edifice built in 1954-itself a compromise from
what had been enacted in 1933-had largely been torn down.
D. The JOBS Act Relieffor Emerging Growth Companies
The 2005 reforms barely had time to become familiar before the financial
collapse and global recession destabilized much of finance. As the U.S.
struggled to regain its economic vigor, efforts to promote capital formation and
hoped-for job creation became a priority for the nation's lawmakers. The
JOBS Act of 2012 was a largely bipartisan response that specifically sought
to encourage more IPOs by eliminating some of the regulatory burdens new
public issuers face under both the '33 and '34 Acts-building a so-called
"on-ramp"for issuers that qualify as emerging growth companies ("EGCs")."
As with the 2005 reforms, we can ignore much of this deregulation. To be
sure, there are aspects of the IPO deregulation that are controversial and deserve
close attention, like the invitation for new issuers to make a confidential filing of
their registration statement. But they do not involve Section 5's communication
rules, and so are not our concern here.
There are two major JOBS Act changes that affect communications. The
first, in new Section 5(d), is the authorization for both issuers and offering
participants to communicate in the pre-filing period with accredited institutional
investors in order to "test the waters" before committing to a public offering."
78 Id.; see CoX ET AL., supra note 5, at 538-39. The reforms also made "time of contract of sale"
the measure for assessing whether solicitation material was false or misleading, not any subsequent
filings. 17 C.F.R. § 230.159 (2013).
79 Langevoort &Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS
Act, supra note 14, at 371, 384; 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1 9 ) (2o2) (defining emerging growth companies as
issuers with revenues of less than si billion). For a thorough set ofdata and commentary, see LATHAM
& WATKINS, LLP, THE JOBS ACT AFTER ONE YEAR: A REVIEW OF THE NEW IPO PLAYBOOK
(Apr. 5, 2013) [hereinafter LATHAM & WATKINS REPORT], available at http://www.lw.com/news/
jobs-act-at-one-release (explaining the results from thorough data and commentary that the vast
majority of IPO issuers fall into the EGC category); see also ERNST & YOUNG, THE JOBS ACT:
ONE-YEAR ANNIVERSARY (Apr. 2013), available at http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/
TheJOBSAct:_One-year.anniversary/sFILE/JOBSActAnuiversary._CCo368- 9 April2o 3 .pdf.
80 15 U.S.C. § 7 7e(d) (202).
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This goes well beyond the 2005 reforms because it enables conversations that
focus specifically on the possible offering and invites underwriters to take part.
This is a moderate reform insofar as it limits contacts to those with presumably
sophisticated institutions. It can be seen as a form of pre-book-building,
though no doubt the intention is to allow conversations with key investors as to
whether the offering is worth doing in the first place.
The second is far more interesting and requires a bit of background.
Broker-dealer firms have long provided so-called sell-side research on
publicly-traded companies, including recommendations to buy, sell, or hold.
Were research to be initiated at the time of an IPO, it would presumably violate
Section 5 as a written "offer" by an underwriter or dealer, whether or not the
research was published by a deal participant.s'
For offerings by seasoned issuers, the SEC has for some time had safe harbor
rules that enable research to occur or continue even though a public offering is
taking place. The most sensitive of these is Rule 139, which sets the conditions
under which even underwriters-with an obvious self-interest in promoting
the offering-can continue to publish research." But Rule 139 has never
been available with respect to IPOs. 3 Around the time the tech-stock bubble
burst a little more than a decade ago, ample evidence arose that underwriters
were using the promise of favorable research coverage as a means of obtaining
investment banking business but harming purchasers. The resulting scandals
led to a variety of restrictions designed to build a "wall" between research and
banking. Research by deal participants was impermissible until the offering was
complete and (by FINRA rule) insider lock-ups had expired.84
Whether all this was something of an overreaction is debatable.8 5 Positive
research makes issuers more visible to investors, supporting a higher market
valuation. The overall decline in the number of analysts covering smaller issuers,
particularly after the introduction of decimalization in pricing that reduced
spreads in traded stocks, has sometimes been cited as a reason for the decline
in IPOs.16 The IPO community took the JOBS Act as an opportunity to seek
relief, and Congress delivered. Research analysts were given the freedom to take
more of a role in discussions with potential issuers, and underwriters and other
deal participants could initiate coverage at the time of the offering."
81 As of 2005, such research publications could presumably be a free writing prospectus.
82 See COX ET AL., supra note 5, at 186-88.
83 7 C.F.R. § 23 o.i39 (b) (203) (applying the rule to issuers required to file periodic reports
under the 1934 Act).
84 z7 C.F.R. § 230.139; COX ET AL., supra note 5, at 135-36,io39-41.
85 See Jill E. Fisch, Does Analyst Independence Sell Investors Short?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 39, 72-74
(2007) (discussing the significant evidence of a reduction in the research coverage of smaller issuers
since the reforms went into effect).
86 Id. at 76.
87 15 U.S.C. § 77e(d) (2012) (stating that a publication by a broker or dealer of a research
report about an emerging growth company is not a prospectus or offer).
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This was controversial enough-obviously, the pressure on analysts will be
to help sell the stock and support the after-market. But those conflicts are fully
disclosed, and other regulatory restrictions remain in place, so that the precise
effects to this new form of sales pressure are hard to estimate." We can almost
certainly put this reform in the category of trading lower investor protection for
enhanced capital formation, but it is not clear by how much. Nevertheless, the
controversy over this amply visible deregulation almost completely obscured a
much bigger impact on Section 5.
The proponents of enhanced sell-side research at the time of an offering
wanted to promote oral as well as published research. For this the standard
regulatory safe harbor description of research then in use would not work-the
SEC had, as recently as the 2005 reforms, refused to extend the safe harbors
to oral dissemination of recommendations." Instead, the JOBS Act alters
the definition of both "offer" and "prospectus" (the key words in Section 5)
to exclude a research report, with research report then defined to mean any
"written, electronic, or oral communication [by a broker or dealer] that includes
information, opinions, or recommendations with respect to securities of an
[EGC],.. .whether or not it provides information reasonably sufficient upon
which to base an investment decision."90
One can see how this might seem necessary to authorize the oral
communication of sell-side research, and the remainder of the definition simply
repeats language drafted by the SEC for use in the research communication rules
in 2005.9' But step back and ask whether there is any form of salesmanship by
an offering participant-even e-mail spam-that is not effectively eliminated
from Section 5 when the issuer is an EGC. If read literally, this takes out of
Section 5's communication limitations the very sort of action that section is
most concerned with: sales efforts to whet the appetite of investors, whether
pre-filing or during the waiting period. With respect to underwriters and
dealers, it leaves Section 5(b) and (c) an empty shell.
88 Some finance scholars question whether recommendations by conflicted analysts distort
stock prices in the first place. See Anup Agrawal & Mark A. Chen, Do Analyst Conflicts Matter?
Evidence from Stock Recommendations, 51J.L. & EcON. 503,530-31 (20o8).
89 2005 Release, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act Release No.52,056, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,993,70 Fed. Reg. at 44,762.
90 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(3) (2012).
91 2005 Release, Securities Act Release No.8591, Exchange Act Release No. 52,056, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. at 44,762. This contrasts with other forms of the
regulation of analyst research, like Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § s5 D, 5 U.S.C § 780-6 (2012),
and the SEC's Regulation A-C, 17 C.F.R. § 242.501 (2013), which refer to reports that are sufficient
on which to base an investment recommendation. While the more expansive permission granted
by revised Rule 139 was not very well explained, it was clearly designed to free up less formal selling
activity by sell-side analysts, much of whose work consists of telephone calls with large institutional
investors. 7 C.FR. § 230.139 (2012).
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All this was largely missed in the immediate aftermath of the JOBS Act.92
Once the SEC realized what had happened, it engaged in non-acquiescence, 3
apparently believing that Congressional intent could not have been such a
thorough gutting of the statute. We will have to see how all this eventually
plays out, but in a world of textualist statutory interpretation, it is hard to see
how the legislature's words mean anything except what they literally say. To this
point, the industry has been cautious in using the new freedom it was given as a
result of the research rule reforms-other parts of the securities laws permit the
SEC and FINRA to respond to overreaching here-but the potential breadth
of the change is startling.9 4
E. Summary
Even if we put aside the JOBS Act research reforms, Section 5 is now a far
different, less fearsome restraint on the IPO selling process than it once was. It
reflects a faith that selling efforts are not so troubling as long as a preliminary
or final prospectus is available to the potential investor and/or the investment
professionals involved on both the sell and buy sides. We are thus left with the
normative question of whether Section 5's slow death-and the more vigorous
selling efforts that have evolved-should trouble us.
II. EVALUATING SECTION 5's DEMISE
A. The Economics oflPOs
IPOs can be promoted much more aggressively in light of the changes
detailed in Part I. Determining whether this is problematic best begins by
looking at the economics of the IPO process, one of the most thoroughly
studied subjects in finance.
Almost by definition, an IPO is about price formation in the absence of
a fair interplay of supply and demand that sets an equilibrium market price.
That is to say, up to the time of trading (and probably a while thereafter),
there is no reliable objective measure of the value of the security, and in all
likelihood substantial subjective disagreement."1 So a demand curve has to be
92 The issue is discussed in COX ET AL., supra note 5, at 16o.
93 See LATHAM & WATKINs REPORT, supra note 79, at 6.
94 Practitioners have good cause to be cautious and so we do not want to overstate our
claim here. Among other things, many of the analyst research rules still apply, and this has been a
high visibility enforcement area for the SEC. In addition, FINRA Rule 221o regulates customer
communications that would apply to the kinds of communications seemingly excluded from "offer"
and "prospectus." Communications with the Public, FINRA Rule 2210 (203), available at http://
www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/industry/pIz7o6.pdf
95 There are trading markets for non-public issuers, but to this point, it does not appear
that they offer enough depth and liquidity to offer a reliable market price. See Langevoort &
Thompson, "Publicness" in Contemporary Securities Regulation After the JOBS Act, supra note 14;
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created, and book-building-eliciting non-binding bids from sophisticated
institutional investors as a result of the sequence of closed road shows and
private communications-is the dominant solution to how to go about finding
the optimal fixed offering price."6
One of the enduring puzzles in finance has to do with the predictable
underpricing of IPOs as an artifact of book-building. Over the past decades,
with a high degree of regularity, the short-term secondary market price rises
after the effective date, often considerably-the so-called "pop" in the stock
price. That suggests that the fixed offering price could have been higher, so that
the issuer has left money on the table by not taking sufficient advantage of the
demand for its securities. We have to be careful here, because the prevailing
market price reflects the demand for single shares rather than the amount that
it would take to find enough buyers to take the issuer's entire supply. But even
so, the magnitude of the underpricing requires explanation.
The standard account is informational, which is often put forward to justify
the entire enterprise of book-building. Institutional investors have private
information-the product of their own proprietary research as well as their
own demand preferences-that is costly to reveal. They will not be open and
candid with the underwriters unless given a credible commitment that they will
be compensated, and so book-building will fail. Underpriced allotments are the
solution: the underwriters make an implicit promise that in this or subsequent
offerings they will be paid for the value of the information embedded in their
bids, based on how forthcoming and aggressive they are. Because underwriters
and these large institutions deal with each other repeatedly, reputational
incentives suffice.
Accepting this basic premise, is the underpricing no more than necessary
to induce the key investors' candor and participation? Here the controversy
begins. Although underwriters are formally limited to their seven percent
spread in terms of their own compensation, they might be able to favor their
repeat institutional customers by underpricing more aggressively and getting
soft dollar kickbacks in return.97 The IPO scandals in the aftermath of the
tech-stock bubble a little more than a decade ago exposed some of these
Elizabeth Pollman, Information Issues on Wall Street 2.0, I6I U. PA. L. REV. 179, 206-07 (2012). All
this might change in the future, in which case there might be opportunities to take advantage of
private markets as IPO substitutes. See A.C. Pritchard, Revisiting "Truth in Securities" Revisited.
Abolishing IPOs and Harnessing Private Markets for Public Good, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 999 (2013)
(referring to and evaluating Milton Cohens seminal article, Truth in Securities Revisited 79 HARv.
L. REv. I340 (1966)).
96 Lawrence M. Benveniste & Paul A. Spindt, How Investment Bankers Determine the Offer
Price andAllocation ofNew Issues, 24 J. FIN. EcoN. 343, 349 (1989); see also Wilhelm, supra note 62,
at 56.
97 See Hsuan-Chi Chen &Jay R. Ritter, The Seven Percent Solution, 55J. FIN. 1105, 1105 (2ooo);
see also William K. Sjostrom,Jr., 7he Untold Story of Underwriting Compensation Regulation, 44 U.C.
DAVIs L. REV. 625, 631-32 (2010).
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temptations." But will issuers-who are hardly unsophisticated-learn to resist
this exploitation? Maybe not, for a variety of reasons. Perhaps there is collusive
behavior by the securities industry that makes issuer resistance difficult, or
maybe underpricing is palatable to the issuer because it provides some insurance
against the draconian liability that the Securities Act generates." The most
common explanation, however, is that the issuer's insiders see personal profit
opportunity in the underpricing because the "pop" may enable greater profits
when they sell their own shares later on, when lock-up agreements expire."
These are not Section 5 problems, however, at least not directly. If
book-building is about a delicate negotiation between the underwriters and
institutional investors leading to systematic underpricing of IPOs, we need not
worry about these investors. While there will be retail investors as well in the
initial round of sales, the fixed-price offering means they will get the same
price as the institutions. Thus, in the absence of retail-only IPOs, we might
reasonably wonder why we need Section 5's sales restrictions at all. Institutional
investors presumably do not need to be told to wait and read the prospectus
before deciding to invest if they find that information necessary or valuable
(which certainly justifies the JOBS Act's new Section 5(d)).
We do have to be somewhat cautious here. One of the insights of the
economics literature is that underwriters and preferred customers (the
major institutions) are repeat players whose interactions extend among
many offerings.'o' An institution might make a generous bid in one offering
with the expectation that it is helping out the underwriters now, expecting
compensation in other ways or other deals. So, we cannot be entirely confident
that the institutional pricing mechanism assures fairness in any given deal.
Moreover, institutions can exit fairly quickly in the aftermarket, relying on the
underpricing for short-term protection.'02 While underwriters naturally want
to discourage too much early flipping, this is all negotiable.
In any event, the major Section 5 problems are less likely to arise from
book-building solicitations than from the impact of the offering on secondary
market trading.o3 Underpricing is a function of the difference between the fixed
offering price and the likely after-market price; the higher the latter, the more
98 See, e.g., EBC I, Inc. v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 832 N.E.2d 26,30 (N.Y. 20os). See generally
sources cited supra note 16.
99 Janet Cooper Alexander, The Lawsuit Avoidance 7heory of Why Initial Public Oferings Are
Underpriced, 41 UCLA L. REV. , 19 & n.6 (1993).
too E.g., Daniel J. Bradley et al., 7he Quiet Period Goes out with a Bang, 58 J. FIN. 1, 6 (2003).
lox See sources cited supra note 96.
102 See Reena Aggarwal, Allocation ofInitial Public Offerings and Flipping Activity, 68 J. FIN.
EcoN. I1, u12-14 (2003); Thomas J. Chemmanur et al., 7he Role ofInstitutional Investors in Initial
Public Offerings, 23 REv. FIN. STUD. 4496, 4499-500 (2010) (finding institutions sell approximately
seventy percent of their allocations in the first year and are rewarded for holding with future
allocations).
103 Bradley et al., supra note oo; see also Daniel J. Bradley et al., The IPO Quiet Period
Revisited, 2 J. INv. MGMT., no. 3, 2004, at 3, 3-4; Pritchard, supra note 95, at 014-15.
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valuable the allocations. For that reason alone, underwriters will try to stimulate
investor demand beyond the initial round of buyers. Moreover, a threat to
include more retail investors in a particularly hot offering might encourage the
institutions to be more generous in their book-building bids. To the extent that
issuer insiders are anxious to take advantage of lock-up expirations occurring
a while after the effective date, they too will reward underwriters who work
to stimulate secondary market demand. Recent empirical evidence supports
the idea that such stimulation is part of the underwriters' job, for which they
are well compensated.1'" The evolution of social media (Twitter, Facebook,
Linkedin, etc.) has expanded the mechanisms for doing this.
Assessing this is difficult, however, because offering participants are hardly
the sole cause of positive investor sentiment in anticipation of an IPO. The
financial media covets emerging growth company stories, especially among
issuers with visible brand names, and can hype without prompting. Investor
enthusiasm can spread virus-like byword of mouth or the electronic equivalent,
amply visible through simple tools like counting Google searches for pre-IPO
issuers.'o Identifying or measuring how much offering participants induce
enthusiasm, then, is impossible in a noisy financial marketplace. But the studies
noted aboveo 6 make clear enough that efforts in this direction are expected,
with compensation that is presumably not for nothing.
A circumstantial case for these IPO marketing practices follows from a
well-known anomaly: even though underpricing is clear, in the long run IPOs
underperform.' 07 That is, the predictable profit opportunities may disappear
fairly quickly, and investors who buy (especially in the aftermarket) and hold
IPOs over a longer time horizon do not fare well. There are many explanations
given for this, including timing, 0 financial reporting,09 and the aggressive
marketing of the IPO itself. The steady increase in the supply of stock for sale
and borrowing, which facilitates short-selling, also puts downward pressure on
the price that was missing in the early days of trading. Arguably, sophisticated
104 See Douglas 0. Cook et al., On the Marketing oflPOs, 82 J. FIN. ECON. 35,36 (2oo6); see
also Fran90is Derrien, IPO Pricing in "Hot" Market Conditions: Who Leaves Money on the Table, 6o
J. FIN. 487, 489-90 (2ooS); Alexander Ljungqvist et al., Hot Markets, Investor Sentiment, and IPO
Pricing, 7 9 J. Bus. 1667, 1670 (2oo6).
105 See Zhi Da et al., In Search ofAttention, 66 J. FIN. 1461, 1488 fig.2 (zon1) (plotting Google
search volumes for issuers in the weeks surrounding their IPO).
1o6 See sources cited supra note 104.
107 See Jay R. Ritter, The Long-Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings, 46 J. FIN. 3, 3-4
(1991).
so8 See Tim Loughran &Jay R. Ritter, The New Issues Puzzle, 50 J. FIN. 23, 46 (1995) (finding
that issuers time public offerings to take advantage of "windows of opportunity" when they are
overvalued).
109 See John M. Friedlan, Accounting Choices ofIssuers ofInitial Public Offerings, it CONTEMP.
AccT. REs. I, 27 (finding that issuers of lPOs use accounting discretion to increase current income
before going public) (1994).
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investors in IPOs may know to get out early except when they have confidence
they have found one of the winners.
We have to be careful not to overstate all this.There is evidence, for example,
that underperforming IPOs are heavily concentrated at the low reputational
end of the spectrum, where the institutional presence is weakest.o10 Nor is it
clear that aggressive media coverage necessarily correlates with long-run
underperformance."' Thus, we cannot simply assume the presence of rampant
opportunism directed at the retail aftermarket. But we cannot rule it out either,
particularly given the cyclical variations in capital raising patterns over time.
B. Economics Confronts Law
The devolution of Section 5 has plainly made it easier to "pump" IPO stocks.
The 2005 reforms, as we have seen, allow even "hyping" publicity up until
thirty days before the filing of the registration statement so long as it does not
reference the offering (even though the offering can be announced separately).
Free writing prospectuses during the waiting period can generate mass media
publicity with nothing more than a filing requirement, as well as more targeted
communications via e-mail and the Internet. Backdoor hyping mechanisms,
like product advertising, are arguably made easier by Rule 169, even within the
thirty-day window and continuing through the waiting period."2 The JOBS
Act redefinition of "research" within the statutory definition of offer opens up
even more potential for conditioning the market prior to the effective date;
the Act's more explicit instruction that brokers involved in the underwriting
can initiate research coverage of the EGC immediately, with predictable "buy"
recommendations, is by all accounts a freedom to pump."3
None of this will come as any surprise to those familiar with the 2005
reforms or the JOBS Act, however. The drafters of both did not deny that more
aggressive publicity would result; rather, they argued that serious abuses are
unlikely. One reason has to do with institutional investors as protectors of the
retail given that offerings are fixed price. Another has to do with the modern
information environment, which gives potential investors access to information
no See Alon Bray & Paul A. Gompers, Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Underperformance
of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies, 52 J.
FIN. 1791, 1818-19 (1997); Laura Casares Field & Michelle Lowry, Institutional Versus Individual
Investment in IPOs The Importance of Firm Fundamentals, 44 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
489,490-91 (2009).
mI See Laura Xiaolei Liu et al., The Long-Run Role of the Media: Evidence from Initial Public
Offerings, 6o MGMT. Sci. (forthcoming 20I4) (manuscript at 3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3 /papers.cfm?abstract id=I 737544.
112 Rule 169 does restrict advertising and other "factual" communications to that which is
consistent with the issuer's normal practices. 17 C.F.R. § 230.J69 (2013). For evidence on the use
of advertising to promote public offerings, see Thomas Chemmanur & An Yan, Product Market
Advertising and New Equity Issues, 92J. FIN. EcoN. 40, 51-59 (2oo9).
113 SeeJOBS Act § Io5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)3) (2012).
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about issuers from a wealth of sources, presumably making public offering fraud
harder to perpetrate. While there is no doubt something to the idea that hiding
the truth is more difficult today than in the past, contemporary frauds like Enron,
WorldCom, and many others show that issuer opacity remains problematic. 114
Indeed, modern technology can amplify fads and fashions as much as it can
expose the truth. Especially without short-selling opportunities to profit from
at the time of the IPO, the few skeptical voices interested in popping a bubble
of excitement are likely to be silenced by the din of enthusiasm from those
anxious for an offering to succeed. We are thus disinclined to put too much
faith in this argument.
C. Liability Rules
The main arguments for why we should not worry about the demise of
Section 5 have to do with the risk of liability. One argument is that no reform
has touched the centerpiece of the Securities Act: the registration statement
with its extensive disclosures about the issuer and the offering, which is
publicly available by the time serious marketing of the IPO commences and
which-as of the effective date-must be true and complete lest extraordinarily
strict liability ensue.' This by itself should be a counterweight to any false or
misleading hype, which is the only hype worth worrying about. We come back
to this in Part III.
The other argument is that there is a set of civil liability and conduct rules
that can be relied upon to deter overreaching in the marketing of the IPO. With
respect to the expansion of research carve-outs in the JOBS Act, for example,
the drafters point to SEC and FINRA rules that are designed to promote analyst
independence from pressure from others in the investment bank, most of which
were untouched in the reforms. There are also both substantive and procedural
limits on solicitation efforts-for example, "know your security" norms, which
require brokers to be familiar with issuer-related information before making
any recommendations to customers," 6 and communication rules that require
supervisory approval of brokers' written outreach efforts, which now includes
social media."' All this relates to a point we have made elsewhere: the Securities
Act was enacted a few years before the advent of substantive broker-dealer
14 See I.J. Alexander Dyck et al., How Pervasive Is Corporate Fraud? 23 (Rotman Sch. of
Mgmt., Working Paper No. 2222608,2013), available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=22226o8 (estimating
that as many as 14.5% of publicly-traded issuers are engaging in fraud at a given time).
115 Securities Act of 1933 § 11,15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2012); see also COX ET AL., supra note 5, at 489.
116 Donald C. Langevoort, Brokers as Fiduciaries, 71 U. PITT. L. REV. 439,444-45 (2oo); Cox
ET AL., supra note 5, at 1033-38-
17 See Communications with the Public, FINRA Rule 221o(b)(i)(D) (2013), available at
http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@reg/@notice/documents/industry/p12 7 06.pdf;
Social Media Websites and the Use of Personal Devices for Business Communications, FINRA
Notice "-39, at 2 (Aug. 18, zon1), available at http://www.finra.org/web/groups/industry/@ip/@
reg/@notice/documents/notices/pl24186.pdf.
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regulation, so that maybe the subsequent emergence of those direct controls on
the selling effort can substitute for the overbroad prophylactics in the statute."s
There is much to be said for this, and we could imagine a
technology-enhanced system of real-time surveillance of the sales and
marketing practices associated with IPOs and other sensitive transactions
that would indeed justify relaxation of the statutory rules. Whether we are at
such a point is open to question, however. Our sense is that the pressure to
market aggressively will find expression in ways that are difficult to detect or
prove as violations. For example, analysts doing research do not need to have
compensation based on their contributions to the banking side to realize that
their career prospects are better if they are in sync with their employers' deal
flow. And investment banks can hire optimists for this kind of work if there
are any doubts, for whom genuine enthusiasm for favored stocks comes easily.
We can say the same about brokers doing other kinds of hard-sell marketing.
But if these softer rules are not powerful enough, maybe other civil
liability rules are. The SEC was clear that their philosophy was to deregulate
communications that were not necessarily troublesome and then use ex post
liability to address the abuses when they are uncovered. These include SEC and
FINRA enforcement actions, for which there is ample authority. Section 17(a)
of the Securities Act, for example, creates liability for misrepresentations or
omissions in the offer or sale of a security, without the need to prove intentional
misconduct."' Here again, however, the question is whether enforcement
resources and detection mechanisms are up to the task.
Private lawsuits by IPO investors add a larger dimension to the policing of
abusive marketing practices, to which the 2005 reforms assign an important
role. Putting aside for a moment situations where the registration statement
itself is false or misleading as of the effective date, two private rights of action
can be invoked: Rule 10b-5'12 and Section 12(a)(2).12'
Rule 10b-5-the general antifraud provision under the federal securities
laws-is not particularly helpful, however, outside the most egregious of IPO
cases. It requires plaintiffs to plead and prove scienter,2 2 which is not always
easy when offering participants seem caught up in deal euphoria. It also has a
challenging "loss causation" standard, whereby plaintiffs have to show that their
stock price losses were the product of the revelation of the truth about what
had been misrepresented, rather than other economic factors. High-visibility
cases challenging biased investment bank research in IPOs have collapsed
simply because of this difficulty.123 But the most powerfil impediment to
n18 See Thompson & Langevoort, Redrawing the Public-Private Boundaries in Entrepreneurial
Capital Raising, supra note 4, at 1625-27
119 See COX ET AL., supra note 5, at 547-50 (discussing the application of Section 17(a)).
120 7 C.ER. § 24 o.io-bs (2013).
121 Securities Act of 1933 § i2(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2012).
122 That is, proof of intentional or reckless fraud. See COX ET AL., supra note 5, at 707-11.
123 See Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 396 F 3 d 161, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2005).
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Rule 10b-5 litigation here is procedural: private enforcement by investors has
to take the form of a class action to be effective, and courts have not been
willing to afford plaintiffs the presumption of reliance in the IPO context that
they do in other open-market fraud lawsuits because the IPO and immediate
aftermarket trading does not occur in an sufficiently "efficient" market.12 4
Without that presumption, the class action is simply not certified.
This leaves Section 12(a)(2), which the SEC promoted in the 2005 reforms
as the primary response to fear of abusive marketing.'25 This statutory provision
allows buyers of securities to sue their sellers for rescissory damages if securities
were sold by means of a false or misleading "prospectus or oral communication,"
subject to a reasonable care defense.12 6 T1he statutory definition of prospectus
refers to any written offering material, upon which the Supreme Court put a
gloss in the Gustafson decision by limiting this category to offering materials
used in a public offering.'27 The 2005 reforms makes clear that, in the opinion
of the SEC, marketing materials used in a registered public offering, including
free writing prospectuses, satisfy this definition.'28 The SEC also adopted a
number of rules to bolster plaintiffs' ability to sue.
Of these, the most potent relates to the definition of "seller,"who is the only
permissible defendant in a Section 12(a)(2) suit. The case law had defined seller
as including only those who passed title to the security to the buyer (i.e., one's
immediate seller) and those who solicit on behalf of the seller.129 ThiS creates
problems in the context of the firm commitment underwriting, because the
securities would move from the issuer to the underwriters and then perhaps
another step or two before coming to rest in the hands of the investor who
claims abuse. The SEC took the view that underwriters and other offering
participants had enough of a seller role to fall within the scope of the term
as understood by the courts-which itself is a little bit of a stretch. But what
about the issuer, which stands at least a step away from the ultimate purchaser?
The case law here was mixed, so the SEC used its definitional rulemaking
authority in Rule 159A simply to declare the issuer a seller for purposes of
Section 12(a)(2) with respect to marketing material for which it bears
responsibility.3 0 With this, the Commission said, victims of abusive marketing
124 In re Initial Pub. Offerings Sec. Litig., 471 F 3 d 24 (2d Cir. 2oo6).
125 In his criticism of the SEC's approach to free writing prospectuses, Professor Thel notes
that the adopting release refers to Section 12(a)(2) more than seventy times. Steve Thel, Free Writing,
33 J. CORP. L. 941, 962 n.99 (2oo8).
126 Securities Act of 1933 § i2(a)(2),15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2012); see also Cox ET AL., supra
note 5, at 528-46.
127 Gustafson v. Alloyd Co.,5I3 U.S.561,569 (1995).
128 See Thel, supra note 125, at 962-63 (criticizing the SEC's approach to Section Iz(a)(2)
liability for free writing prospectuses that are not widely distributed).
129 The Supreme Court has defined "seller" for purposes of Section 12(a)(2) to include the
person who transfers title to the security to the purchaser, and any other person who, for pecuniary
benefit, solicits the transaction. Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622, 623 (1988).
130 17 C.F.R. § 230.159A (2013).
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were protected from any unfortunate consequences of Section 5's partial
disappearance. This would include misrepresentations or omissions in the
preliminary prospectus, free writing prospectuses, or related oral or written
solicitations.
Faith in Section 12(a)(2) is undermined, however, by at least four key
weaknesses. As to the widened definition of "seller" in Rule 159A, which is
crucial to effective policing, a surprisingly large number of courts have been
inclined to stick with the older case law, often not even mentioning the
rule-based change. A few courts have held that the SEC lacks the authority to
change the definition.13' This may reflect a tendency observable elsewhere in
securities litigation, wherein courts are doubtful that the SEC should control
the sensitive subject of private litigation rights.
Beyond this, there is substantial doubt as to whether Section 12(a)(2)
applies to secondary trading as opposed to sales by underwriters and dealers
as part of the IPO itself. The "majority opinion" seems to be that it does not,13 2
which means that aftermarket purchasers have no recourse even if Rule 159A
stands.
The next weakness takes us back to the issue of reliance and the ease of class
certification that has been the subject of so much litigation under Rule 10b-5.
It is generally said that Section 12(a)(2) has no reliance requirement.'33 But
that construal dates back to the original idea that prospectuses were extremely
limited prior to the effective date, so that statutorily authorized free writing was
only really a post-effective possibility (where it received an explicit exemption
from the definition of prospectus).13 4 Thus there really was very little role for
Section 12(a)(2) liability at all, except with respect to offerings of exempt
securities-where the offering document was the functional equivalent of the
statutory prospectus. 3s So it made sense to omit any reliance requirement
(just as there is no reliance requirement under Section 11 for false registration
statements) because the importance of that document could be presumed.
The 2005 reforms, however, radically revised this, inviting all kinds of
communications of varying degrees of visibility and import. As a matter of
131 See In re Kosmos Energy Sec. Litig., 955 F. Supp. 2d 658, 671 (N.D. Tex. 2013); In re
Countrywide Fin. Corp. Mortg.-Backed Sec. Litig., 932 E Supp. zd 1095, 11x8 (C.D. Cal. 2013);
Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Residential Funding Co., 843 E Supp. 2d 191, 207 (D. Mass. 2ozz).
For a contrary view, accepting the rule as valid, see Capital Ventures Int'l v. J.P. Morgan Mortg.
Acquisition Corp., Civ. Action No. 12-oo85-RWZ, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19227, at *27-28
(D. Mass. 2013).
132 See Johnson v. Sequans Commc'ns S.A., No. is Civ. 63 4 1(PAC), 2013 WL 214297, 16-17
(S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Sterling Foster & Co. Sec. Litig., 222 F. Supp. 2d 216, 244-45 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
133 See LoSS ET AL. 4TH ED., Supra note 27.
134 The preliminary prospectus would be an exception, of course, but Section i dominates
liability here so that where the falsity continued on through the final prospectus, buyers would have
no reason to resort to Section 12(a)(2).
135 See Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1225-27 (7th Cir. i98o), cert. denied, 450
U.S. 1005 (1981) (involving a public offering of commercial paper).
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common sense, Section 12(a)(2) will not work without some insistence that
a buyer trace his or her purchase back to the defective prospectus, and the
language in the provision that recovery is appropriate when the securities
were sold "by means of" the false prospectus invites precisely this inquiry."6
If so, there could be at least a backdoor reliance requirement. And if so, it is
highly likely that class certification-the key to effective enforcement in private
securities litigation-will fail. If claimants have differing reliance explanations,
courts may well insist on individualized claims, which probably means few or
no claims. To date, class certification is still commonplace in Section 12(a)(2)
cases, but largely in contexts where it is a tagalong to Rule lOb-5 or Section 11
claims. How much weight it can bear on its own is questionable.
The final weakness takes us back to the definition of prospectus. We
will assume that the SEC is right that the definition of prospectus is broad
enough to include free writing generally. But there are notable exceptions. The
Securities Act explicitly carved out from the definition of prospectus any free
writing after the effective date that is accompanied or preceded by a statutory
prospectus."' More dramatic is the effect of the JOBS Act on EGCs. Any
communication by an underwriter or dealer that falls in the seemingly broad
definition of "research"found in Section 2(a)(3) is excluded from being an offer
or a prospectus. Read literally, as we have seen, that would put most, if not all,
forms of conditioning the market by broker-dealers entirely out of the reach of
Section 12(a)(2).
All this suggests that Section 12(a)(2) may not be a very reliable policing
mechanism at all, which is troubling given how much stress the SEC put
on it in 2005. We suspect that only the SEC and FINRA can realistically
address abuses in conditioning the market, with the doubts about resources
and inclination that are inevitable when dealing with public (or quasi-public)
enforcement authority. To this point, then, there is no compelling response to
the concern that the slow death of Section 5 puts IPO investors more at risk, at
least in the secondary market.
III. THE STATUTORY PROSPECTUS AND THE FILTRATION PROCESS
The great anomaly of Section 5 has been well known almost from its
inception: it seemingly works hard to make the disclosure document (the part
of the registration statement at the effective date that constitutes the final
statutory prospectus) an effective truth-telling tool, yet rarely requires delivery
of it to the investor until after the purchase is complete. 3 ' One might justify
136 Some courts have suggested the need for a showing that the prospectus played "some role"
in the purchase, which could be a very individualized inquiry. See Alton Box Co. v. Goldman Sachs
& Co., 56o F.2d 916, 924 (8th Cir. 1977) (requiring "some causal relationship").
137 See Thel, supra note 125, at 946 (discussing this history in detail).
138 Louis Loss called it a "memento" of the sale. Professor Thel says that the exception for
free writing in the definition of prospectus was designed to compensate for this by giving issuers
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the death of Section 5 on this basis alone. But for just as long, the reality has
been that the work of disclosure is done not by the final prospectus but by
the preliminary prospectus-a filed draft of the disclosure in final-enough
form, which sets an offering price range and typically has already been revised
in response to initial SEC staff comments."' In administering Section 5, the
SEC has long insisted on distribution of the preliminary prospectus to offering
participants and investors who request one; in an IPO, moreover, Rule 15c2-8
requires that each purchaser expected to buy receive a preliminary prospectus
at least forty-eight hours before the sale.'40 Attachment or linkage of the
preliminary prospectus is a condition to the use of most free writing during
the waiting period. And if the SEC staff comes to think that what is in the
preliminary prospectus needs significant change, it will delay effectiveness long
enough to permit recirculation or updating.141
This is the real function of the Securities Act, largely untouched by the 2005
reforms or the JOBS Act. The latter does permit confidential filings so that
the early round of disclosure negotiations with the SEC can be kept private,
but road shows and other significant marketing steps cannot take place until
after the "improved" preliminary prospectus has been filed publicly.142 By all
accounts, misrepresentations in this document trigger Section 12(a)(2) liability
for the seller, albeit subject to the litigation caveats stressed earlier.
In many ways, the demise of Section 5 that we have traced is most readily
defended this way. What is important is high quality disclosure throughout
the marketing period, so that overbroad marketing restrictions are unnecessary
and costly. Those who doubt that many investors actually make much use of
the disclosure itself generally justify this core set of obligations by reference
to "filtration": that what is important during the marketing of an IPO is
that the professionals be informed of the truth about the issuer, so that their
recommendations and related activity will reflect reality rather than hype.143
We do not doubt the importance of filtration, even via professionals with
conflicts of interest (which is a larger category as a result of the JOBS Act
"research" amendments). Surely negative or qualified facts about a company's
past limit salespeople's ability to promote aggressively. The problem with the
statutory prospectus, preliminary or otherwise, is that it is almost entirely
historical (backwards-looking) in what it reveals, whereas the story that drives
the marketing of an IPO is about the issuer's future. The typical IPO issuer has
shown promise; the economics literature and common sense suggest that public
offerings are timed to take advantage of a sense of momentum at a high point in
and underwriters an incentive to distribute the final prospectus earlier. Thel, supra note 125, at 943.
139 See Cox ET AL., supra note 5, at 172-73.
140 7 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-8 (2o13).
141 See John J. Jenkins, Recirculation ofa Preliminary Prospectus: Statutory Basis andAnalytical
Techniques for Resolving Recirculation Issues, 55 Bus. Law. 135,139-40 & n.27 (1999).
142 JOBS Act § ro5(c), IS U.S.C. § 77e (202).
143 See Cox, supra note 15, at 12-17.
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its perceived valuation. What reasonable investors should want to know about
is the sustainability of this promise and momentum.
Litigation under the Securities Act often deals with issuers that make
public offerings not long before hitting a rough patch-product defects or sales
slumps-that sends the stock price downward. Plaintiffs may offer evidence
that, internally, management was aware of warning signs, perhaps even leading
them to lower their private estimates of revenues or earnings at least in the short
term. They will claim that the statutory prospectus was false and misleading for
failing to reveal the looming dangers.
Predictably, defendants will respond by stressing that the Securities Act
does not require issuers to divulge forward-looking information even if it is
material.1" The obligation, they say, is simply to obey the SEC's line-item
requirements and include such additional information as is necessary to make
these disclosures not misleading. For better or worse, they are right. As a result,
plaintiffs in these lawsuits are forced to argue that what was said about past
results was misleading for failure to mention the danger signs, which is not easy
unless the issuer voluntarily put the subject of continuing or future performance
in play. By and large, courts say that truthfully revealing historical facts does not
imply that the future will not be different.
To be sure, there are a couple of line-item requirements that do turn to
the future, on which plaintiffs also seize. There is a duty to disclose major risk
factors, but this requires qualitative revelation of types of risk, not quantitative
disclosure about the likelihood or impact of those risks. IPO lawyers are usually
good about including extensive risk disclosures without specifics. There is also
the Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) portion of the statutory
prospectus, which requires disclosure of "known trends and uncertainties" that
would lead an investor to doubt that past financial performance indicates a
comparable future.'45
Sometimes these arguments work, particularly where what the company is
facing evidences an "extreme departure"from its past success. 146 But more often,
it seems, courts revert to the basic principle that forward-looking information
144 See COX ET AL., supra note 5, at 643-45, 
66 2-
63. For a discussion of the somewhat
confusing law background surrounding the duty to disclose, see Donald C. Langevoort & G. Mitu
Gulati, The Muddled Duty to Disclose Under Rule iob-5, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1639 (2004). The highly
publicized litigation involving Facebook's IPO contains all of these issues. See In re Facebook, Inc.,
IPO Sec. & Deriv. Litig., No. 12-2389, 203 VL 6665399 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.12, 2013) (finding plaintiffs
made sufficient allegations that investors were misled); Memorandum in Support of Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss the Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In re Facebook, Inc., IPO Sec. &
Deriv. Litig., No. 12-CV 7 587 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2013), 2013 L 1874694.
145 SEC Standard Instructions for Filing Forms Under Securities Act of 1933, Securities
Exchange Act of 934 and Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975-Regulation S-K,17 C.F.R.
§ 220.303 (2013); see Cox ET AL., supra note 5, at 6o6-ii.
146 See Shaw v. Digital Equip. Co., 82 F 3d H94, 1210-II (ist Cir. 1996); Mitu Gulati, When
Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing is Coming to an End: The Case of Interim Nondisclosure, 46
UCLA L. REv. 675,731 (1999).
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is not the subject of mandatory disclosure, particularly when they take the form
of projections or estimates. 147 'The issuer has to be honest about its past but need
not reveal all doubts about its future, at least so long as it chooses to remain
discretely silent on such matters rather than saying something affirmatively
misleading.
In sum, what the statutory prospectus reveals to whoever chooses to read
it is not necessarily the whole story about the issuer. The SEC has deliberately
restricted the duty to speak to the future, and discourages IPO issuers from
doing so publicly, even if they want to.14 For this reason alone, we have to
question exactly how much "filtration" value the preliminary prospectus has in
restraining marketing and hype.
In the course ofbook-building, however, sophisticated institutional investors
demand access to what the issuer knows about its future. 'This is the function
of non-public road shows and related communications during the waiting
period. It is commonplace for issuers to reveal forward-looking information
to the underwriters and their research analysts, from which assessments of the
future can be made. These, in turn, are shared with key potential buyers, with an
expectation of privacy. This discriminatory treatment-selective disclosure-is
acceptable practice as a means of encouraging institutions to be forthcoming
with their bids, which as we have seen is key to successful book-building.
Recognizing this, the SEC has explicitly excluded public offerings from the
scope of Regulation FD,149 which otherwise limits selective disclosure to market
professionals and large investors.
All this underscores our basic point. The publicly available disclosure found
in a preliminary prospectus will often be distinctly less than everything a
reasonable investor would want to know, or even everything that institutional
investors are actually getting from the issuer and the underwriters. If this inside
information is thoroughly positive, this may be unproblematic-the institutions
will bid up the fixed offering price, and indeed there may also be aftermarket
buyers beyond the amount of their allocations. In this regard the SEC's
long-standing willingness (including in Regulation FD) to accept this departure
from full disclosure for every investor reflects the value of encouraging the
private information flow from purchasers to the issuer and underwriter that
book-building has long embodied.
If the inside information is negative, however, things get more complicated.
At some level of bad news, of course, the institutions will lose interest
147 See, e.g., In re Lyondell Petrochem. Sec. Litig., 984 F.2d 1050,1052-53 (9 th Cir. 1996).
148 Congress joined in here as well, creating a safe harbor for forward looking information in
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act but exempting IPOs from its protection. See Securities
Act § 27A(b)(2)(D), i5 U.S.C. § 77 z-2(b)(2)(D) (2012).
149 17 C.F.R. § 24 3 .soo(b)(2)(iii) (203). This was expressly reaffirmed in the 2005 reforms.
2005 Release, Securities Act Release No. 8591, Exchange Act Release No- 52,056, Investment
Company Act Release No. 26,993, 70 Fed. Reg. 44,722, 44,76o (Aug. 3, 2005) (to be codified at 7
C.F.R. pts. 200, 228, 229, 230, 239, 240,243,249, & 274).
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entirely-at that point, however, the underwriters would likely have backed
out as well. But as noted earlier, if the negative information is more ambiguous
and the likely demand from the yet-unaware retail public is strong enough,
the better strategy might be to buy but then sell fairly quickly, especially if the
underwriters will tolerate aggressive reselling and/or settle up with preferential
treatment in more attractive future IPOs. If so, the gap between public and
private disclosure, and the use of book-building theory to justify the difference,
remains troublesome. We believe that the Commission should do more here,
perhaps in the nature of a special MD&A requirement for IPOs that sheds more
light on how well the expectations that have been created in the marketplace
mesh with the current realities facing management internally.
CoNCLUSION
One of Section 5's two original functions, its severe restriction on selling
communications outside of the required disclosure, has practically disappeared.
In part this reflects the SEC's belief, which has grown over time, that a
combination of filtered disclosure and strong liability will take care of the
problem. The extraordinary expansion in information available through new
electronic communication capabilities no doubt has also contributed. One
of our contributions here is to show the concern for facilitating the flow of
information from purchasers to issuers and underwriters, as illustrated in book
building, provides another important explanation.
Our survey of the demise of Section 5's communication rules should be
cautionary, however. Even in a world in which the initial fixed price buyers
are heavily institutional and presumably able to fend for themselves (and do
indeed extract more disclosure than the law requires), the ability to condition
the market is less restrained than it used to be. Aftermarket buyers, at least,
would appear to be more at risk. The justifications for backing off the old
prophylactics-especially the supposed liability threats-do not bear as much
weight as their proponents suggest.
That does not necessarily mean, however, that the demise is bad public
policy. Some level of reform was both necessary and inevitable.s 0 Perhaps legal
costs go down in a more permissive environment, though anyone who goes
through the 2005 reforms mind-numbing complexity on when to file a free
writing prospectus pursuant to Rule 433 would be skeptical of this. Another
possibility is that the anachronistic communication rules from 1954 never
worked that well for investors anyway, so that there was little actually lost.''
150 See Cox, supra note 15, at 24-25-
151 Conversely, it is also possible that the reforms have not really be taken advantage of, so
that marketing practices stay much like they were even in a more liberalized setting. Those who
believe that the First Amendment demands a more permissive approach to commercial speech by
issuers and underwriters could justify the changes by that reason alone. See Heyman, supra note ii.
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We are not aware of empirical study of the 2005 reforms that would help us tell,
and the JOBS Act is much too recent to make any judgments.
Our strong suspicion, however, is that this turns out to be a story about the
trade-offs between capital formation and investor protection. The JOBS Act
comes close to acknowledging that motivation. There was little effort in the
legislative history to say that investors would be better off because of these
changes-rather, the IPO changes were designed to make registered public
offerings more appealing to entrepreneurs deciding whether to make one or
not. If more jobs come about as a result, we can hardly say for sure that a
moderate erosion of investor protection was not worth it. Like others, however,
we will wait with some skepticism to see precisely what comes.
For skeptics about IPOs, this story may simply bolster the need for sweeping
changes. The claim that both capital formation and investor protection would
be improved by IPO auctions rather than a continuation of book-building
has been made in both the economics and legal literature.152 Or perhaps, as
Adam Pritchard suggests, we should just declare IPOs off-limits to retail
investors, insisting on a period of seasoning for new issuers in the private
securities markets before they graduate to the public ones.'s
The merits of these proposals are beyond this Article. IPOs are enough
part of the popular culture of finance to survive academic or political doubts
about their fairness and efficacy. Their lottery-ticket appeal is hard to deny.
Retail investors' tendency to become infatuated with an issuer and support
its aftermarket long enough for financial institutions to make their money is
precisely the point.
Even though we are concerned, we do not want to be alarmist about all
this. The bulk of the Securities Act as it applies to public offerings remains,
regardless of the demise of the communications bar in Section 5. The 2005
reforms and the JOBS Act made moderate reforms, not radical ones. The SEC
is still in control of the registration process, and severe civil liability still attaches
to falsity in the registration statement upon its effectiveness. But once, there
was a political instinct to do more to restrain the selling process. Why this is
less so today is worth more attention than both legal scholars and investors are
giving it.
152 See, e.g., Hurt, supra note 16, at 777-78. But see Peter B. Oh, The Dutch Auction Myth, 42
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 853 (2007) (advocating for an alternative to the traditional book-building
method: the Dutch auction IPO).
153 See Pritchard, supra note 95.
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